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It is not immediately obvious that there was anything 
connecting Husserl or phenomenology with Wittgenstein’s 
work, but with an examination of the evidence, this attitude 
can be changed. I will establish the modest probability that 
Wittgenstein had contact with the ideas of Husserl, and 
that the ideas of Husserl were either directly or indirectly 
influential in Wittgenstein’s work. Wittgenstein’s concern 
with phenomenology is most explicitly expressed in his 
Philosophical Remarks (hereafter Remarks), however 
there is tacit concern throughout most of his writing. 
The first section of the Remarks begins with a discus-
sion of phenomenology. It serves to introduce the idea that 
Wittgenstein believed himself to be working on phenome-
nological problems. The issue is with what he calls a 
“phenomenological language.” A phenomenological 
language is an attempt to construct an ideal, pure, 
language of thought, that stresses the grammar over the 
content, form over the particular facts expressed by that 
form. He says: 
I do not now have phenomenological language, or 
‘primary language’ as I used to call it, in mind as my 
goal. I no longer hold it to be necessary. All that is 
possible and necessary is to separate what is essential 
from what is inessential in our language.  
That is, if we so to speak describe the class of lan-
guages which serve their purpose, then in so doing we 
have shown what is essential to them and given an 
immediate representation of immediate experience…
  
A recognition of what is essential and what inessential in 
our language if it is to represent, a recognition of which 
parts of our language are wheels turning idly, amounts 
to the construction of a phenomenological language 
(Wittgenstein 1975). 
Before this point, Wittgenstein had a phenomenological, 
“primary” language as a goal. Where? The Tractatus, with 
its pictorial presentations, draws a limit to the expression of 
thoughts, and clarifies the logic of our language by 
elucidating the possibility inherent in any statement that 
has sense (Sinn). This pure grammar, or essentialist 
definition of language, was sought there. Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus tries to say what can be said about the form of 
thought and language, and to attempts to show what 
cannot be said about the formal structures of our thought.  
The early Wittgenstein had said, “Language disguises 
thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the 
clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought 
beneath it…”(Wittgenstein 1961). Thus, clarity about the 
form of a proposition, its “pictorial form,” or grammar, 
would clearly display the possibilities of language. In 
defining any possible language as a language only in 
terms of what is required for representation to occur 
(through establishing the elements essential to any 
picture), the Tractatus presents a purely formal language. 
Husserl did not develop a special language to convey the 
universal structures, though their description was a primary 
concern of his. How much, perhaps, did Husserl’s 
management of language influence Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy in its analysis of ordinary language? 
After 1929 Wittgenstein’s stated goal was to examine 
the form of ordinary language. It was not to construct a 
logical, meta-language, like Frege’s “language of thought,” 
but to clarify the ordinary one by uncovering the necessary 
requisites for representation. This is one basic difference 
between Wittgenstein’s early and later periods: the shift 
from pure to ordinary language analysis. In place of a 
language that disguised thought, the picture-language of 
the Tractatus was to have a clinical cleanliness. Wittgen-
stein’s attitude in the Philosophical Investigations is 
different: instead of a “primary” language of thought, which 
would communicate nothing in the end, a more rough 
hewn language grips the world better (see Wittgenstein 
1968). The hope for a transparent medium through which 
to transmit our thoughts is now seen to be itself a 
prejudice. We can see this shift in terms of his stance on 
phenomenology, on the cusp of his change from the 
Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations.  
Wittgenstein’s goal is comparable with Husserl’s, as 
Husserl states it in the introduction to Volume II of the 
Logical Investigations. Husserl begins with a discussion of 
linguistic expression, of our attempts to communicate 
meaningfully. He says: 
Linguistic discussions are certainly among the philoso-
phically indispensable preparations for the building of 
pure logic: only by their aid can the true objects of logical 
research, …be refined to a clarity that excludes all 
misunderstanding. We are not concerned with gram-
matical discussions, empirically conceived and related to 
some historically given language: we are concerned with 
discussions of a most general sort which cover the wider 
sphere of an objective theory of knowledge and, closely 
linked with this last, the pure phenomenology of the 
experiences of thinking and knowing… This phenome-
nology must bring to pure expression, must describe in 
terms of their essential concepts and their governing 
formulae of essence, the essences which directly make 
themselves known in intuition…(Husserl 1976) 
Husserl did not promote a radical revision of language, but 
he cannot be said to have “left language alone,” as he 
proceeded to stipulate the “phenomenological” meaning of 
a glossary of terms. This is precisely what Wittgenstein 
accuses Husserl of, in his conversations with Schlick 
(Waismann 1979). Nevertheless, Husserl claims, “Rough 
reflection on our thoughts and their verbal expression, 
conducted by us without special schooling, … suffice to 
indicate a certain parallelism between thinking and 
speaking.” (Husserl 1976) The goal for Husserl’s phe-
nomenology was to express, within ordinary language, the 
essential grammar of thought, a descriptive, eidetic (not 
empirical), science. For Husserl, it was the case from the 
beginning that the structures of thought could be ex-
pressed directly through an ordinary (though modified) 
language. 
We can define Husserlian phenomenology as funda-
mentally characterized by the following aspects: 
1. Concern with the faithful description of the structure of 
immediate experience; that all knowledge begins in 
experience. Phenomenology provides the grammar of 
experience. 
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2. Phenomenological truths are intuited from immediate 
experience, insofar as the syntax of immediate experi-
ence can be repeatedly confirmed by any conscious 
entity through reflection that is free from prejudice, thus 
allowing a pure description. This constitutes phenome-
nological objectivity. 
3. Empirical sciences, such as psychology and physics, 
are founded on the grammar of immediate experience 
and the rules of logical justification. Consequently, 
phenomenology cannot be generated by the sciences, 
but serves as the grounds for the sciences.  
4. Husserl’s phenomenological method is based on the 
epoché, the suspension of the “natural attitude.” The 
“natural attitude” is the underlying prejudice of an 
objective world existing independently of experience. 
The epoché is why phenomenology is unencumbered by 
the metaphysical mind-body question, allowing for a 
pure description of experience. This allows phenome-
nology to uncover essential characteristics of an imper-
sonal abstract Ego via a kind of Wesenschau. 
5. Like Franz Brentano, Husserl identifies the intention-
ality of consciousness as paramount among these 
structures. This is the relationship between conscious-
ness and the world. 
In examining how many of the above phenomenological 
aspects are presented in Wittgenstein, we first find a 
united stance against psychologism. Though this anti-
psychologism is shared with Frege, Frege was uncon-
cerned with the given, immediate experience, which he 
believed to be inherently subjective Vorstellungen, and in 
principle not objective. Attending the phenomena is not 
enough. It is the recognition that phenomenology is a “first 
philosophy” which demands the establishment a descrip-
tive grammar of immediate experience, a language of 
thought. Once one rejects the sciences as the source of 
this grammar, as a field that already presumes logic, there 
is nowhere else to turn but to a type of phenomenology.  
It is clear that Wittgenstein, like Husserl, also rejected 
the notion that philosophy could ever become one field 
amongst others in the sciences, physical or psychological. 
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein claims, “The totality of true 
propositions is the whole of natural science…,” “Philoso-
phy is not one of the natural sciences,” and “Psychology is 
no more closely related to philosophy than any other 
natural science.”(Wittgenstein 1961) In the Remarks, 
Wittgenstein’s most substantial analysis of phenomenol-
ogy, we also find:  
Physics differs from phenomenology in that it is con-
cerned to establish laws. Phenomenology only estab-
lishes the possibilities. Thus, phenomenology would be 
the grammar of the description of those facts on which 
physics builds its theories. To explain is more than to 
describe; but every explanation contains a description. 
(Wittgenstein 1975) 
Wittgenstein echoes a conceptual relationship between 
phenomenology and science that one sees both in the 
Tractatus and in Husserl. Both Husserl and Wittgenstein 
attempt to grasp the essential rules which allow for the 
designation of a space of possible states of affairs or 
experiences; and since this phenomenological logic sets 
up the scaffold upon which the true facts, or particulariza-
tions, of physics hang, we see how physics depends upon 
phenomenology. Husserl thus claims:  
All natural science is naïve in regard to its point of 
departure…As a result, the following is clear: should 
there be decisive arguments to prove that physical 
natural science cannot be philosophy in the specific 
sense of the word, can never in any way serve as a 
foundation for philosophy, and can achieve a philosophi-
cal value for the purposes of metaphysics only on the 
basis of a prior philosophy, then all such arguments 
must be equally applicable to psychology. Now, there is 
by no means a lack of such arguments (Husserl 1965). 
Both Husserl and Wittgenstein then concur that philoso-
phy, qua phenomenology, is non-reducible to neither 
psychology nor physics. 
In that phenomenology establishes the possibility of 
physics, and thus the physical sciences, which extrapolate 
their general laws from particular instances, both Husserl 
and Wittgenstein concur that phenomenology must itself 
be outside of the arena of physics. How they delineate an 
area of study that is outside physics is somewhat distinct. 
Husserl, after the developments set forward in his Ideas I, 
believed that one could achieve a phenomenological 
attitude, allowing for a sort of phenomenological percep-
tion to occur, by invoking the epoché. Wittgenstein, 
however, in attempting to extrapolate thoughts from 
language use, believes that: 
All our forms of speech are taken from ordinary, physical 
language and cannot be used in epistemology or phe-
nomenology without casting a distorting light on their 
objects.     
The very expression ‘I can perceive x’ is itself taken from 
the idioms of physics, and x ought to be a physical 
object – e.g. a body – here. Things have already gone 
wrong if this expression is used in phenomenology, 
where x must refer to a datum. For then ‘I’ and ‘perceive’ 
also cannot have their previous senses. (Wittgenstein 
1975) 
What is Wittgenstein describing other than the requirement 
that investigations pursued under the epoché be described 
in a unique, phenomenological language? In other words, 
if phenomenology is not scientific, and if our natural 
language, like the “natural attitude,” is embedded in 
physicalistic grammar, then when Husserl uses terms that 
seem ordinary, like “I,” “perception,” and “object,” these 
words mean something quite different than what we’d 
normally mean by them. Husserl needed a phenomenol-
ogical language, a ‘primary’ language, for ordinary 
language is ill equipped to reflect the fine-grained 
distinctions Husserl asks of it. 
What Wittgenstein is responding to are attempts to 
describe immediate experience in its purity, without 
considering the fact that to describe requires some kind of 
medium. Wittgenstein recognizes that medium to be 
language. Nevertheless, it cannot be ordinary language 
(which remains in the natural attitude), but a primary 
language, one that can transcend the effects physics has 
had. In the following, Wittgenstein describes a moving, 
mechanical reproduction of a visual experience, in order to 
produce an identical experience in someone else (“you will 
now see exactly what I saw, as I saw it), and then 
responds: 
Isn’t it clear that this would be the most immediate 
description…? …Anything which tried to be more 
immediate still would inevitably cease to be a descrip-
tion. Instead of a description, what would then come out 
would be that inarticulate sound with which many writers 
would like to begin philosophy. (‘I have, knowing of my 
knowledge, consciousness of something.’) (Wittgenstein 
1975) 
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Throughout the Remarks, Wittgenstein discusses visual 
space and color, toothaches and pain, the experience of 
memorial-time and harmony from a phenomenological 
perspective. He recognizes repeatedly that physics cannot 
give an account of “subjective” or “qualitative” experience, 
and also recognizes that phenomenology remains within a 
descriptive domain of possibilities as a description of the 
structure, or grammar, of experience. Wittgenstein further 
claims, “The worst philosophical errors always arise when 
we try to apply our ordinary –physical– language in the 
area of the immediately given” (Wittgenstein 1975). Is 
Wittgenstein calling for a language that can express what 
is left after a Husserlian style reduction?  
Wittgenstein’s phenomenological language must also 
include intentionality, for, “If you exclude the element of 
intentionality from language, its whole function then 
collapses” (Wittgenstein 1975). The “directedness” of 
intentionality, therefore, cannot be found in consciousness, 
nor is it found in objects, but is to be found in the meanings 
of language. Language doesn’t then have a derivative 
intentionality, but is the primary source of reference 
through its meanings. He says, later in the Philosophical 
Grammar that, “The German word for ‘meaning’ [Bedeu-
tung] is derived from the German word for ‘pointing’ 
[deuten]” (Wittgenstein 1974). If Wittgenstein remains 
faithful to Frege, Bedeutung names the relationship 
between words and objects, between a Thought and its 
truth-value. He rejects the idea that a proposition acts as a 
proper name, whose object is its truth-value, in the 
Tractatus. Rather a proposition becomes thought only as it 
is written or spoken, whose Sinn is its possibility (deter-
mined by its grammar) and whose Bedeutung is the actual 
state of affairs. Bedeutung is referential, for Wittgenstein, 
but, as Bedeutung, has its existence only in language. 
Much of his later philosophy is dedicated to dispelling the 
myth that there is anything particularly mental, or mysteri-
ous, about Bedeutung, and thus, nothing particularly 
mental about intentionality. So intentionality, the possibility 
of directedness, is a function of language mapping onto 
the world; intentionality becomes not the Husserlian “mark 
of the mental” but the mark of the linguistic. 
Wittgenstein’s prominent use of “phenomenology” 
occurred near the zenith of Husserl’s phenomenological 
movement. Consequently, his use of the term would have 
Husserlian connotations, and would require explicit 
distinctions for it not to have this connotation. His use is 
similar in a broad sense to the Husserlian program, 
including his anti-psychologism, his emphasis on a formal 
description of immediate experience, his insistence that 
such a primary description is not found through materialist 
physics, and the insistence on the intentionality in 
language. The simplest explanation is that, directly or 
indirectly, Husserl influenced Wittgenstein in a significant 
fashion. 
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